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Abstract: According to the two-systems account of mindreading, our mature perspective-
taking abilities are subserved by two distinct mindreading systems: a fast but inflexible, 
“implicit” system, and a flexible but slow “explicit” one. However, the currently available 
evidence on adult perspective-taking does not support this account. Specifically, both Level-1 
and Level-2 perspective-taking show a combination of efficiency and flexibility that is deeply 
inconsistent with the two-systems architecture. This inconsistency also turns out to have 
serious consequences for the two-systems framework as a whole, both as an account of our 
mature mindreading abilities and of the development of those abilities. What emerges from this 
critique is a conception of context-sensitive, spontaneous mindreading that may provide insight 
into how mindreading functions in complex social environments. This in turn offers a bulwark 
against skepticism about the role of mindreading in everyday social cognition. 
 
1. Introduction: 
For decades, social cognition research has been dominated by the idea that we navigate the 
social world by attributing mental states to other individuals in order to predict and explain 
their behavior – the ability known as “theory of mind” or “mindreading” (Carruthers 2013; 
Fodor 1992; Goldman 2006; Nichols and Stich 2003). This approach to social cognition has 
been quite fruitful, and has yielded an immense body of empirical knowledge about the 
development of our social cognitive abilities and their neural underpinnings (Baillargeon et al. 
2010; Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Wellman 2014). But philosophers and psychologists are 
nevertheless divided over how great a role these folk-psychological concepts actually play in 
our everyday lives. While many continue to assume that the mindreading paradigm is basically 
sound, others have suggested that it is deeply flawed as an account of our ordinary socio-
cognitive abilities, and must be radically re-thought. 
One of the most compelling skeptical arguments about mindreading draws our attention to the 
unbounded scope of paradigmatic folk-psychological inferences (Bermudez 2003; Morton 1996; 
Zawidzki 2013). This argument begins with the idea that belief-formation itself is a holistic, 
unbounded, “isotropic” process (cf. Fodor (1983)). Our actions can be informed by an 
indefinitely wide range of beliefs and desires. For instance, when I decide to take the metro 
rather than drive, I may do so because I believe that taking the metro is better for the 
environment, and I desire to make environmentally-friendly choices; it may also be because I 
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think that parking is expensive, and I wish to save money; or I may believe that I am being 
followed, and I wish to lose my pursuers on the crowded metro platform.  There are, in other 
words, indefinitely many different folk-psychological ways to rationalize a particular action. 
When interpreting other people’s actions, the argument goes, we are faced with the daunting 
task of sifting through this immense space of possible mental causes, and abductively inferring 
which belief-desire set best explains the action in question. Such a process would no doubt be 
incredibly demanding and effortful, and would place heavy demands on executive systems like 
working memory – that is, if the task were not completely intractable. It thus seems highly 
unlikely that we engage in this kind of inference during our everyday social interactions, which 
occur at a very rapid pace. 
Motivated by these and other skeptical concerns, a number of theorists have proposed 
alternatives to mindreading in order to explain our everyday social-cognitive abilities. Some 
have suggested that we gain knowledge of mental states via automatic, perception-like 
processes (Gallagher 2008). Others have argued that we draw on folk-psychological narratives 
and social norms to predict behavior, rather than belief-desire inferences (Hutto 2012). Still 
others have suggested that many of our socio-cognitive abilities may be subserved by a 
combination of low-level associations between perceptions of behavior and domain-general 
attentional processes (Heyes 2014). It has even been suggested that these abilities are parts of 
dynamical systems that emerge during social interactions with multiple agents, and thus 
cannot be explained in individualistic terms and all (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). 
It is worth emphasizing the broad-reaching, often radical consequences of these anti-mentalistic 
proposals. Mindreading is widely believed to be central to many uniquely human social 
practices: linguistic communication (Grice 1991; Wilson and Sperber 2012), moral judgment 
(Mikhail 2007; Thomson 1976; Young et al. 2007), joint action (Bratman 1992; Tomasello et al. 
2005) and establishing new social conventions (Lewis 1969). Our grasp of the psychological 
underpinnings of these activities hinges on the view that mindreading is a cornerstone of social 
cognition. If we abandon the mindreading paradigm, then our theories about these important 
human activities must also be re-thought. 
In the context of this dispute over the scope of theory of mind in our everyday social lives, the 
two-systems account of mindreading (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Apperly 2011; Butterfill and 
Apperly 2013) seems to offer something of a middle ground: on the one hand, it adheres to the 
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basic idea that some form of mindreading is pervasive in our everyday lives. But on the other 
hand, two-systems theorists agree with mindreading skeptics that the attribution of “full-
blown” propositional attitudes such as beliefs is generally quite slow and effortful, places heavy 
demands on attention and working memory, and likely requires fairly advanced linguistic 
abilities. Because it is so demanding, proponents of the two-systems account agree that this 
form of reasoning is unlikely to contribute to many of the ordinary social practices that are 
often associated with it. When it does, it is likely scaffolded by some of the very processes 
proposed by anti-mindreading theories, such as social norms and narratives (Apperly 2011).  
And yet, two-systems theorists also maintain that we are nevertheless equipped with an 
innately-channeled, automatic mindreading system that is constantly active in the presence of 
other agents. However, the representational capacities of this system, according to the two-
systems account, fall well short of the kind of unconstrained belief-desire reasoning typically 
associated with mindreading. Instead, this “implicit” mindreading system is said to employ a 
limited set of quasi-mentalistic, mainly extensional concepts and inference rules that allow us to 
roughly predict behavior. Because of its limited representational capacities, this system exhibits 
a number of signature limits that distinguish it from genuine, “explicit” mindreading. 
Specifically, the implicit mindreading system is said to be insensitive to the fact that agents 
represent the world under a particular mode of presentation. For example, this system could 
never predict that Lois Lane would be surprised to see Clark Kent fly, even if she knew that 
Superman can fly, and that Superman is Clark Kent, because the implicit system would be 
insensitive to the fact that a single individual can be represented in a number of different ways. 
Thus, according to this view, humans possess two “systems” for mindreading: the early-
developing, automatic “implicit” system, and the later-developing, slow and effortful “explicit” 
system. Initially, human infants start out with just the implicit mindreading system, and as a 
result, their mindreading abilities are subject to its signature limits. As they get older, acquire 
language, and gain social experience, children develop explicit mindreading abilities, which 
start to emerge after their fourth birthday. Ultimately, these two systems exist side by side in 
adulthood, producing distinct types of mental state judgments in parallel to one another, 
creating a dissociation between implicit and explicit forms of mindreading (Low and Perner 
2012). 
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The main goal of this paper is to offer a critique of the two-systems account of mindreading. 
Specifically, I will be arguing that the two-systems account is unable to accommodate the 
extant empirical evidence on one, very central type of mental-state attribution: the attribution 
of perceptual states or “perspective-taking.” I’ll further argue that these problems generalize to 
other aspects of theory of mind, and thus seriously undermine the two-systems account. What 
emerges in its place is a picture of mental-state attribution that lies somewhere in between the 
automatic, rigid information processing of the implicit mindreading system, and the slow, 
effortful reasoning of the explicit system. The evidence that I will discuss suggests that even 
“full blown” forms of mental-state attribution can be both fast and flexible, and that “implicit” 
forms of mindreading can be highly flexible and context-sensitive. This combination of speed 
and flexibility is achieved via the coordinated integration of domain-specific mindreading 
strategies with goals, attention and knowledge stored in long-term memory.  
But while the main target of this paper is the two-systems account, this critique has broader 
implications for mindreading skeptics as well. This is because a key flaw in the two-systems 
account is that it accepts the skeptic’s claim that genuine mindreading must be slow and 
cognitively effortful. A proper understanding of the underlying processes that enable 
mindreading shows that this is a mistake. Thus, the picture of mindreading that emerges from 
my critique of the two-systems account can also serve as a reply to the skeptic: we should not 
abandon the mindreading paradigm so quickly. 
In the second section of this paper, I will discuss the general theoretical motivations for the two 
systems account. Then, in section 3, I will introduce the notion of perspective-taking as it 
occurs in the social cognition literature, and explain how the two-systems account purports to 
explain perspective-taking phenomena. In sections 4 and 5, I will argue that the evidence from 
perspective-taking undermines key claims about the implicit and explicit mindreading systems, 
respectively. In section 6, I will show how the problems from perspective-taking generalize, 
and ultimately undermine the two-systems account as a whole. In section 7, I’ll discuss the fast, 
flexible conception of mindreading that emerges from my critique, and how it can serve as a 
bulwark against theory-of-mind skepticism. 
2. Why two systems? 
The motivation for proposing two systems for mindreading, its proponents argue, becomes 
especially clear when we consider the kinds of properties that human mindreading must possess 
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in order to successfully navigate ordinary social interactions. First, our mindreading abilities 
must be very fast and efficient, in order to keep up with the pace of ordinary behavior. Second, 
they must also be representationally flexible, since we need to be able to attribute an indefinite 
range of attitude contents to others in order to make sense of the complexity of human 
behavior. The problem, according to two-systems theorists, is that,  
[T]here is a tension between the requirement that mindreading be extremely flexible 
on the one hand, and fast and highly efficient on the other. Such characteristics tend not 
to co-occur in cognitive systems, because the very characteristics that make a cognitive 
process flexible – such as unrestricted access to the knowledge of the system – are the 
same characteristics that make cognitive processes slow and effortful. Instead, flexibility 
and efficiency tend to be traded against one another. This trade-off is reflected in 
Fodor’s distinction between “modular” versus “central” cognitive processes. (Apperly 
2013, pp. 73–74) 
Thus, human beings need at least two mindreading systems because no single system could be 
both efficient and representationally flexible. According to this view, we rely on the fast and 
inflexible system when we need to rapidly anticipate what others will do, while we turn to the 
slow, flexible system when we need to carefully reflect on their specific beliefs. Thus, the reason 
the implicit system is unable to represent “full-blown” propositional attitudes is because these 
are thought to place heavy demands on working memory, which is slow but representationally 
flexible (Butterfill and Apperly 2013).1 The implicit system gains its speed and efficiency from 
the fact that it can circumvent these forms of reasoning, and rely instead on a strictly limited 
set of quasi-psychological concepts and inference rules to automatically generate rough-and-
ready predictions about behavior. But when accurate behavioral prediction means factoring in 
the way that an agent represents a particular state of the world, this system ought to make 
systematic errors. The explicit system, meanwhile, should be able to accommodate these cases; 
but this processing will inevitably be slow and effortful, and always goal-dependent. 
																																								 																				
1 Why is representing “full-blown” propositional attitudes so demanding? Butterfill and Apperly write: 
On any standard view, propositional attitudes form complex causal structures, have arbitrarily nestable 
contents, interact with each other in uncodifiably complex ways and are individuated by their causal and 
normative roles in explaining thoughts and actions…. If anything should consume working memory and 
other scarce cognitive resources, it is surely representing states with this combination of properties. 
(Butterfill and Apperly 2013, pp. 609–610) 
 See Carruthers (2015c) for a critique of this argument.	
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The purported properties of the implicit mindreading system appear to derive from its 
modularity. In particular, Apperly (2010) emphasizes the essential role that informational 
encapsulation would play in the two-systems architecture. An informationally encapsulated, 
modular system could permit us to circumvent the need for effortful uses of working memory in 
many social interactions, thus rendering mental-state attribution fast and efficient, and even 
possible for young infants and non-human animals. However, such a system would also be 
representationally limited, due to its lack of access to working memory and stored knowledge. 
In other words, the tension between the need for flexible and efficient mindreading that 
motivates the two-systems proposal is explained by the trade-offs inherent in a modular, 
informationally encapsulated architecture.2 
Moreover, Apperly (2010) suggests that informational encapsulation may provide part of the 
solution to the challenge raised by mindreading skeptics mentioned in the introduction. He 
argues that a modular, informationally encapsulated system could impose “hard constraints” on 
the scope of our folk-psychological inferences, thus limiting the need for complex, abductive 
reasoning. By restricting the range of possible inputs that it could process, and by sharply 
delimiting the kinds of inferences that could be made on the basis of those inputs, an 
encapsulated, implicit mindreading system offers us a way to render mental-state attribution 
computationally tractable. Thus, the notion of informational encapsulation seems to provide the 
two-systems account with both a basic architectural framework and a potent theoretical 
justification. 
Problematically for the two-systems view, there is growing consensus among cognitive 
scientists that perceptual systems – the paradigms of modularity (Fodor 1983; Pylyshyn 1999) 
– are not, in fact, informationally encapsulated.3 Instead, we find that abstract, conceptual 
knowledge “penetrates” even the earliest, most rapid stages of visual processing. For instance, 
there is evidence that feedback signals from inferotemporal conceptual areas impact processing 
in the visual cortex just 100ms following stimulus onset, well before the onset of endogenous 
attention (Wyatte et al. 2014). Similarly, Moshe Bar and colleagues have shown that conceptual 
																																								 																				
2 There are a number of other well-known modularist approaches to theory of mind (Fodor 1992; Leslie et al. 
2004; Scholl and Leslie 1999); however, these accounts tend not to sharply distinguish between implicit and 
explicit mindreading systems, as the two-systems theorists do. Although a discussion of these views is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is likely that many of the arguments to come that are directed at the two-systems account 
will also pose challenges for them as well. 
3	For a recent review of this topic, see Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016).	
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information in the orbitofrontal cortex gets applied to rapidly transmitted, low spatial-
frequency visual information, which is then projected back to mid-level and high-level visual 
processing areas 50ms before object-recognition takes place (Bar et al. 2006; Chaumon et al. 
2014). There is also EEG evidence that linguistically encoded categorical distinctions (e.g. the 
lexical distinction between light and dark blue in modern Greek) can penetrate pre-attentional, 
pre-conscious processing in the visual cortex as early as 200ms after stimulus onset (Thierry et 
al. 2009). In short, there appear to be a number of pathways by which conceptual information 
stored in long-term memory can penetrate even paradigmatically modular systems, such as 
early visual processing.  
The fact that vision is unencapsulated tells us something important: the trade-off between 
speed and representational flexibility is not mandated by our cognitive architecture.4 But just 
because certain aspects of perceptual processing may be unencapsulated, it does not follow that 
there are no genuinely encapsulated systems. For instance, the analogue magnitude system, 
which served as a model for the implicit mindreading system (Apperly and Butterfill 2009), 
may well be impenetrable to goals and information stored in long-term memory (Feigenson et 
al. 2004). However, the question still arises: is fast, efficient mindreading truly informationally 
encapsulated, like analogue magnitude reasoning? Or is it more like early vision, and capable of 
using both top-down and bottom-up information to rapidly and flexibly interpret the social 
environment?  
3. The case of perspective-taking: 
A key test-case for the claim that the implicit mindreading system is truly encapsulated is the 
component of theory of mind known as “perspective-taking,” which consists in the ability to 
represent what other agents see. In the empirical literature on the subject, there is a well-
established distinction between two different “levels” of perspective-taking, which captures two 
different ways in which an organism might represent the visual perspective relation. “Level-1” 
perspective-taking consists in the ability to represent what another agent can see. Level-1 
perspectives are construed as external, spatial relations that hold between agents and objects in 
their environments. This kind of relation depends primarily on environmental factors, such as 
																																								 																				
4 In their own critique of the two-systems view, Christensen and Michael give a number of examples of well-
studied cognitive systems that also succeed in achieving both flexibility and efficiency without the need for strong 
encapsulation, including the orbitofrontal cortex, the mid-level visual system, and language comprehension 
(Christensen and Michael 2015).	
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an unobstructed line-of-sight, lighting, and distance. To be a Level-1 perspective-taker thus 
consists in representing whether this external relation is present or absent, and forming 
appropriate expectations about behavior on this basis. For instance, a Level-1 perspective-taker 
would not expect an agent wearing a blindfold to reach towards a goal object in front of her, 
because the blindfold interrupts her line-of-sight.  
“Level-2” perspective-taking, in contrast, appears to be uniquely human. It involves 
representing the way that other agents see the world. Rather than a direct relation between 
agents and their environments, the Level-2 perspective relation holds between agents and 
representational contents; however, it depends upon some of the same environmental factors as 
Level-1 perspective-taking, such as line-of-sight. The key difference between Level-1 and 
Level-2 perspective-taking is that only the latter is sensitive to the representational, aspectual 
nature of vision.  
To illustrate, imagine that you and a partner are seated opposite one another at a table, and 
lying flat upon the table is a screen with the numeral “9” on it. In the purely extensional, Level-
1 sense, you would both see the same thing: “9”. But in the intensional, Level-2 sense, you 
would each see something different: while you would see the numeral as the number nine, your 
partner would see it as the number six. In other words, the more complex Level-2 relation 
permits us to track differences in mode of presentation.  
In humans, Level-1 perspective-taking abilities emerge fairly early in development, and are 
even present in infancy (Luo and Johnson 2009; Masangkay et al. 1974; Moll and Tomasello 
2006). A number of non-human animal species are also capable of Level-1 perspective-taking, 
including corvids, canines, and great apes (Bräuer et al. 2004; Bugnyar et al. 2016; Call and 
Tomasello 2008). The ability to represent Level-2 perspectives seems to emerge somewhat 
later in childhood, after the fourth year of life – the same age when children pass the standard 
false belief task. (Flavell et al. 1981; Low et al. 2014; Surtees et al. 2012). For this reason, Level-
2 perspective-taking is said to signal children’s acquisition of a representational theory of mind 
(Rakoczy 2015). 
Beyond its comparative and developmental applications, the Level-1/Level-2 distinction has 
also been invoked to describe adults’ perspective-taking abilities. Specifically, it has been argued 
that representing Level-1 and Level-2 perspectives involve distinct cognitive processes 
(Michelon and Zacks 2006; Qureshi et al. 2010; Samson et al. 2010; Surtees et al. 2012; Surtees, 
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Samson, et al. 2016). Level-1 perspective-taking appears to be very rapid, places relatively few 
demands on executive resources, and seems to employ a simple line-of-sight heuristic. Level-2 
perspective-taking, in contrast, appears to be slow, places heavy demands on working memory, 
and employs a kind of embodied mental rotation procedure (Surtees et al. 2013a).  
The distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking thus seems to offer a clear-cut 
case of the dissociation between the implicit and explicit mindreading: Level-1 and Level-2 
perspective-taking each possess developmental and cognitive profiles that map fairly neatly 
onto the two mindreading systems. Accordingly, the two-systems account makes a number of 
specific predictions about perspective-taking that bear directly upon the issue of informational 
encapsulation. First, if the implicit system is truly informationally encapsulated, then Level-1 
perspective-taking should be insensitive to the background knowledge of the perspective-taker. 
Second, if Level-2 perspective-taking truly places heavy demands on working memory, then we 
should expect it to operate in a goal-dependent fashion, and to be relatively slow and effortful. 
To test the first prediction, Samson et al. (2010) created the “dot-perspective task.” In this task, 
adult participants had to rapidly judge what either they or an avatar could see. Subjects were 
presented with a scene in which an avatar stood alone in a room facing a wall. In Consistent 
Perspective trials, black dots appeared on the wall that the avatar could see. In Inconsistent 
Perspective trials, some of the dots appeared on the wall that the participant could see, but the 
avatar could not. In the Self-task, participants had to judge how many dots they themselves 
could see; in the Other-task, they had to judge how many dots the avatar could see. Samson and 
colleagues found that people were much slower to respond and made more errors in the Self-
task for Inconsistent perspective trials. Participants seemed to represent the avatar’s Level-1 
perspective even when it was irrelevant to their current goal, to the point that it interfered with 
their performance – exactly as the two-systems account predicted it would.  
To test the prediction that the implicit system cannot represent Level-2 perspectives, Surtees et 
al. (2012) presented participants with another scene containing an avatar; but this time, instead 
of dots, the experiment used numerals displayed on a table in front of the avatar opposite the 
participant – the “number-perspective task.” On Consistent Perspective trials, a numeral like ‘8’ 
was displayed, which both the avatar and the participant saw the same way. In Inconsistent 
Perspective trials, a ‘6’ or a ‘9’ was presented on the table, which the participant and avatar 
would perceive differently; thus, this task required Level-2 perspective-taking abilities. As in 
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Samson et al., participants completed both Self and Other tasks. Unlike in the Samson et al. 
experiments, the Inconsistent perspective of the avatar did not interfere with their response 
times on the Self-task. Participants appeared to only compute the other individual’s perspective 
on the Other-task, when it was goal-relevant – once again, just as the two-systems account 
predicted. 
While these results do seem to bear out the above predictions, a number of other findings in the 
perspective-taking literature are not so easily accommodated by the two-systems framework. In 
the next section, I will argue that we have good evidence that Level-1 perspective-taking is 
neither fully encapsulated nor truly automatic. In section 5, I will argue that Level-2 
perspective-taking need not be slow and cognitively effortful.  
4. Level-1 perspective-taking is unencapsulated: The argument from gaze-cueing 
To see why the Level-1 perspective-taking evidence does not fully support the two-systems 
account, we need to consider another experimental paradigm that also aims to study implicit 
perspective-taking: gaze-cueing. Gaze-cueing tasks measure the effects of shifts in the direction 
of a target’s eye gaze or head on covert spatial attention – that is, changes in attention that 
happen prior to any overt forms of attention shifting, such as movements of the eyes or head 
(Posner 1980). In gaze-cueing studies, subjects are presented with a task-irrelevant face in the 
center of a screen, with eyes that move either in one direction or another (Friesen and 
Kingstone 1998; Hood et al. 1998). Subjects then witness an object suddenly appear either on 
the same side as the direction that the face’s eyes have “looked” (a congruent trial) or on the 
opposite side (an incongruent trial). The gaze-cueing effect occurs when subjects are faster to 
detect the object on the congruent side than the incongruent one. These effects are extremely 
rapid – on the order of 10-15ms - and are also specific to social stimuli (Kingstone et al. 2004; 
Ristic and Kingstone 2005).5 Thus, gaze-cueing seems like exactly the kind of effect that one 
																																								 																				
5 Since cueing effects can also be triggered by other kinds of directional stimuli, such as arrows (Ristic et al. 2002), 
some have suggested that this process might be the product of a domain-general covert orienting mechanism 
(Santiesteban et al. 2014). However, these two types of cueing effects appear to have distinct cognitive, 
developmental, and neural bases. Specifically, gaze shifts appear to issue in a distinctly spatial cueing effect for the 
specific location where the eyes look, whereas arrows produce object-based cueing effects for any items that appear 
on the congruent side, regardless of their specific location (Marotta et al. 2012). Further, while gaze-cueing effects 
appear even in extremely young infants (Farroni et al. 2009; Hood et al. 1998), cueing effects from other kinds of 
stimuli do not emerge until much later in development (Jakobsen et al. 2013). Finally, gaze-cueing, but not other 
kinds of cueing, produces activity in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), a neural region associated with social 
cognition (Ristic and Kingstone 2005) (see also Michael and D’Ausilio (2015). 
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might expect from the implicit mindreading system: it is extremely fast, unconscious, and 
tracks Level-1 perspectives. 
If the implicit system were truly encapsulated, knowledge stored in long-term memory would 
not affect it. However, we know from a wide range of studies that gaze-cueing is in fact 
sensitive to background knowledge. For instance, Eva Wiese and colleagues showed 
participants a robot-face cueing stimulus (Wiese et al. 2012). In one experiment, they found 
that participants were much less likely to be cued by the gaze-shifts of the robot than those of a 
human face. However, in another experiment, participants were explicitly told that an 
experimenter was intentionally controlling the robot’s gaze-shifts. In this condition, 
participants were just as likely to be cued by the robot-face as the human face. Thus, the 
presence of explicit, folk-psychological background knowledge about the stimulus affected 
whether or not partners were cued by an otherwise non-agentive stimulus. 
Similarly, when a cueing stimulus is ambiguous, background knowledge about whether or not 
it is an intentional agent can modulate whether it produces a cueing effect. Ristic & Kingstone 
(2005) showed subjects an ambiguous stimulus, and told them that two eye-like shapes were 
either eyes or wheels on a car; they found cueing effects for the eyes condition, but not for the 
car condition. Even more strikingly, Terrizzi and Beier6 recently showed participants an 
unfamiliar entity and modulated whether or not, prior to the cueing trials, subjects saw another 
agent appear to interact with it in a contingent, seemingly social manner. They observed “gaze” 
cueing effects for the unfamiliar entity (even though it did not, in fact, possess eyes, but merely 
a presumed front and back) in the social interaction condition, but not in the non-social 
condition.  
Background knowledge about whether or not a human face can see also modulates the cueing 
effect. Teufel and colleagues showed participants images of a face wearing goggles; beforehand, 
subjects had the opportunity to handle a seemingly identical pair of goggles (Teufel et al. 2010). 
However, one group handled goggles with opaque lenses (such that the wearer would not be 
able to see through them), while another group handled goggles with transparent lenses. They 
found that only participants who handled the transparent goggles were cued by the head-
																																								 																				
6 Submitted manuscript: “Automatic Attentional Cueing by a Novel Agent in Preschool-Aged Children and 
Adults” (personal communication). 
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movements of the stimulus. Thus, if participants knew that the face could not see, the cueing 
effect was attenuated. 
Importantly, these studies always showed subjects in both experimental and control conditions 
perceptually identical stimuli; all they varied was the background knowledge that subjects had 
about what they were looking at. In other words, these studies provided a perfect test for 
informational encapsulation, and showed that gaze-cueing is not encapsulated after all. Thus, 
contrary to the two-systems account, background knowledge affects Level-1 perspective-
taking. 
One study from the two-systems group offers a potential avenue for them to respond to this 
point. Using the same stimuli as in the Samson et al. study described above, Qureshi et al. 
(2010) tested whether or not Level-1 perspective-taking would be affected by concurrent 
executive demands; according to the two-systems account, it should not. To do this, they used a 
dual-task interference design in which subjects had to complete the dot-perspective task while 
simultaneously tapping along with a recorded beat. They found that the cognitive load task did 
interfere with task performance, but this interference was similar for both the Self- and Other-
tasks. While this finding might initially be interpreted as undermining the claim that Level-1 
perspective-taking is truly an efficient process, the authors argued that the similar interference 
effects for both Self- and Other-trials showed that the tapping task did not interfere with the 
calculation of Level-1 perspectives as such, but rather with the attentional selection of 
perspectives in general. According to this picture, the Level-1 perspective-taking process would 
involve two components: a perspective-selection process that places demands on domain-
general attention, and a domain-specific, encapsulated mechanism for perspective-calculation. 
Accordingly, proponents of the two-systems account could argue that all the gaze-cueing 
studies show is that the Level-1 perspective-selection process is unencapsulated from 
background knowledge, but that the perspective-calculation process is not. Thus, in cases when 
the gaze of a target face is known not to be indicative of genuine seeing, that perspective might 
not be selected by attention, and thus no perspective-calculation would occur. But it could still 
be maintained that Level-1 perspective-calculation is encapsulated, once a given perspective has 
been selected.  
This distinction between selection and calculation enables the two-systems theorist to maintain 
that that there could be an encapsulated mechanism for Level-1 perspective-calculation. But at 
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best, such a mechanism could only be one component of the system that performs the function 
of Level-1 perspective-taking. This is because perspective-selection also seems to be a necessary 
part of the perspective-taking process: in the absence of perspective-selection, no perspective-
taking could take place. Thus, we could not ascribe the function of Level-1 perspective-taking 
solely to the perspective-calculation mechanism. If there is a “system” that is responsible for 
Level-1 perspective-taking, then it must also include whatever mechanism or mechanisms that 
accomplish perspective-selection – and these, it appears, are unencapsulated. Thus, while the 
“system” responsible for Level-1 perspective-taking might involve component parts that are 
informationally encapsulated, this does not change the fact that Level-1 perspective-taking as 
such is sensitive to background knowledge.  
Moreover, acknowledging a role for domain-general attention in the perspective-taking process 
also undermines the claim that Level-1 perspective-taking is truly automatic – that is, if by 
“automatic” we mean a process that is mandatory, stimulus-driven, and goal-independent 
(Moors and De Houwer 2006).  This is because, more often than not, domain-general attention 
is goal-directed (Carruthers 2015a). In paradigmatic instances of “top-down” attentional 
orienting driven by the dorsal orienting network, these goals are conscious. But attention can 
also be controlled by the ventral orienting network, which is sensitive to unconscious goals and 
motivations (Corbetta et al. 2008).7 Thus, by acknowledging a role for attention in perspective-
selection, two-systems theorists are opening up a space where goals might play a significant 
role in the Level-1 perspective-taking system.  
Consistent with this possibility, other studies have shown that knowledge of the social group 
memberships of a target face, including its age, race, social status, and perceived threat all affect 
gaze-cueing (Chen and Zhao 2015; Dalmaso et al. 2012; Pavan et al. 2011; Slessor et al. 2010). 
In addition to interactions between the gaze-cueing mechanisms and long-term memory, these 
findings show that gaze-cueing is also sensitive to motivational factors: when a face is 
motivationally salient – for instance, because it belongs to a threatening out-group member – 
we preferentially allocate attentional resources in order to follow its gaze. However, when a 
																																								 																				
7 Granted, attention can sometimes be “captured” in an automatic, goal-independent manner by environmental 
stimuli (Knudsen 2011), and it’s conceivable that Level-1 perspective-taking could likewise be the product of 
purely bottom-up processing. However, many of the gaze-cueing experiments cited above were able to perfectly 
control for such low-level effects by using perceptually identical stimuli in both experimental and control 
conditions. The factors that modulated Level-1 perspective taking in these experiments could not have been purely 
stimulus-driven. 
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face is not motivationally salient – say, because it belongs to a low-status in-group member – 
we do not preferentially attend to its gaze direction. In other words, Level-1 perspective-taking 
appears to be highly sensitive to our social goals. 
Thus, the evidence from gaze-cueing seems to shows that Level-1 perspective-taking is neither 
wholly encapsulated, nor truly automatic. Of course, Level-1 perspective-taking is also not 
under explicit, top-down, conscious control. Rather, its information-processing profile seems to 
belong somewhere in between these two.  It is better described as a “spontaneous” process: it is 
fast, efficient, and unconscious, but also sensitive to background knowledge and goals 
(Carruthers 2015b). Notably, this kind of process does not quite fit with the descriptions of 
either the implicit or explicit systems. Instead, it seems to share attributes of both. 
If this picture is right, and Level-1 perspective-taking is really spontaneous, rather than 
automatic, then why do subjects in the dot-perspective task represent the avatar’s Level-1 
perspective? This did, after all, conflict with their overt goal, and it is not obvious what else 
might have motivated participants to attend to its perspective. One possibility is that even 
though Level-1 perspective-taking is not genuinely automatic, we may possess a standing 
disposition to represent other agents’ perspectives when doing so is cognitively efficient.8 
Given that what other agents can see tends to be behaviorally relevant, and that calculating 
Level-1 perspectives is not particularly demanding, such a disposition would be fairly adaptive 
in most situations. In practice, this might make Level-1 perspective-taking seem automatic in 
most situations, when in fact it is really motivation-dependent. 
5. Level-2 perspective-taking can be fast and efficient 
The argument from gaze-cueing suggests that Level-1 perspective-taking does not quite fit 
with the description of the implicit mindreading system as automatic and encapsulated. 
However, it leaves untouched the basic claim that Level-2 perspective-taking should be a slow, 
effortful, working-memory-based process. Thus, two-systems theorists may be willing to 
concede that Level-1 perspective-taking is more flexible than they initially supposed, but still 
argue that Level-2 perspective-taking, which involves “full-blown” propositional attitude 
																																								 																				
8 Along similar lines, Fiebich & Coltheart (2015) suggest that which socio-cognitive procedure we use is 
determined by whether or not it will be cognitively effortful in a given context (Fiebich and Coltheart 2015). 
(Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this reference to my attention). 
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attribution, must possess something like the cognitive profile of the explicit mindreading 
system.  
Notably, Level-2 perspective-taking tasks almost always involve some kind of mental rotation 
(Flavell et al. 1981; Low et al. 2014; Surtees et al. 2013b), as this seems to be one of the most 
straightforward empirical methods for creating a dissociation between Level-1 and Level-2 
perspectives. Problematically, mental rotation is known to place heavy demands on working 
memory even when mental-state attribution is not involved (Hyun and Luck 2007). Peter 
Carruthers has recently argued that this role for mental rotation constitutes a serious confound 
for many Level-2 perspective-taking tasks, and that these tasks do not so much demonstrate a 
difference in the concepts of seeing deployed in Level-1 and Level-2 scenarios or a difference in 
underlying mindreading systems as a difference in non-mentalistic task demands (Carruthers 
2015b, 2015c). As an alternative explanation, Carruthers suggests the lack of altercentric 
interference in the number-perspective task was due to motivational factors: because they were 
not sufficiently motivated to represent the avatar’s perspective, subjects in this task simply did 
not go to the trouble of mentally rotating the numeral on the table.9 
One interesting possibility that emerges from Carruthers’ motivation-based interpretation is 
that changing the motivational structure of the number-perspective task could potentially lead 
participants to maintain a representation of the other agent’s Level-2 perspective. Elekes and 
colleagues investigated this possibility by creating a modified version of the number-
perspective task, which subjects either completed by themselves (the Individual condition) or 
with another participant (the Joint condition) (Elekes et al. 2016). This initial modification of 
the number-perspective task is especially noteworthy: while a nondescript avatar might be 
salient enough to warrant Level-1 perspective-taking, it is not obvious that participants would 
care enough to go to the trouble of maintaining a representation of its Level-2 perspectives. 
Exchanging the avatar for a live human being both increases the potential salience of the target 
(real people are generally more interesting than nondescript avatars), and improves the 
ecological validity of the paradigm. As we’ll see shortly, this manipulation proves to be 
effective. 
																																								 																				
9 Carruthers does accept that the evidence from the dot-perspective task shows that Level-1 perspective-taking is 
automatic, although he denies that these results are best explained in terms of a non-representational concept of 
seeing. On his “one-system” account, the attribution of mental state concepts is automatic when executive 
resources are not required, and “spontaneous” when they are. However, the argument from gaze-cueing from the 
previous section shows that even Level-1 perspective-taking is a spontaneous activity, rather than truly automatic.	
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Subjects in this experiment completed a number-verification task, which involved rapidly 
judging whether the number they saw on a screen lying flat in front of them was the same as 
the number they heard in an audio recording. In the Joint condition, experimenters 
manipulated whether participants believed that the person seated across from them was 
completing the same number-verification task (the perspective-dependent task), or an n-back 
task in which subjects had to judge whether or not the color of the number on the screen was 
the same as the number that came before it (the non-perspective-dependent task). Thus, in both 
tasks in the Joint condition, subjects knew that their partner was also attending to the numeral 
on the screen, but only subjects completing the perspective-dependent task believed that their 
partner was attending to the same aspects of the numeral (namely, its value). But importantly, 
all subjects ever had to do was complete their own task; their partner’s performance was 
irrelevant.  
The experimenters found that subjects in the Joint condition were slower than in the Individual 
condition, but only when both completed the perspective-dependent task and the numerals of 
the screen were such that their values differed on the basis of perspective (i.e. 2, 5, 6 and 9); for 
numerals whose values appeared to be the same regardless of which side of the table the 
participant was at (i.e. 0 and 8), there was no difference between the individual and joint 
conditions. In effect, subjects were only slower when 1) they had a live partner, 2) they believed 
that their partner had a similar goal, and 3) the partner’s response would diverge from their 
own on the basis of their Level-2 perspective. These results suggest that knowing that a 
partner possesses a similar goal to one’s own creates an unconscious motivation to maintain a 
representation of their perspective, even when this is not relevant to one’s overt goal. When 
this representation differs from one’s own first-personal one, this creates altercentric 
interference.  
Using a very similar design, Surtees and colleagues obtained a slightly different set of effects 
(Surtees, Apperly, et al. 2016). Like Elekes et al. (2016), they used a number-verification task 
that used live partners seated on opposite sides of a display that lay flat on the table between 
them; in one of the experiments, Surtees et al. also included a version of that task where one 
partner made judgments about a surface feature of the numeral on the screen, rather than its 
value. And just like in the Elekes et al. design, subjects only ever had to judge the value of the 
number from their own perspective – the perspective of the other participant was always task-
irrelevant. However, in the Surtees et al. (2016) design, subjects took turns instead of 
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completing the task at the same time; turn-taking either occurred within the same block of 
trials (with the two participants alternating rapidly), or in separate blocks (with one participant 
going first and the other going second).  
Like Elekes and colleagues, Surtees et al. found that the presence of a live participant affected 
subjects’ Level-2 perspective-taking, with an altercentric interference effect when their 
perspectives were inconsistent, and also a facilitation effect when their perspectives were the 
same. But unlike Elekes et al., they found that altercentric interference arose even when the 
partner was attending to surface features of the numeral, rather than its value. They also found 
that altercentric inference did not occur in subjects who went first when completing the task in 
separate blocks; however, when the second partner took her turn, the altercentric interference 
effect re-emerged.  
Collectively, the results of Elekes et al. (2016) and Surtees et al. (2016) yield a number of 
conclusions regarding Level-2 perspective-taking, as well as some open questions. First, using 
a live participant instead of an avatar seems to increase the likelihood that subjects will 
spontaneously adopt another agent’s Level-2 perspective, even when it is not relevant to their 
overt goals; however, the mere presence of a live participant is not sufficient for this to occur. 
In the simultaneous task design of Elekes and colleagues, participants only took their partner’s 
perspective into account when explicitly informed that they were performing the same task. In 
the turn-taking design of Surtees et al., subjects only adopted their partner’s perspective when 
they had previously observed their partner completing the task that they themselves were 
about to undertake. In both cases, some form of prior knowledge was necessary for spontaneous 
Level-2 perspective-taking to occur.  
The fact that subjects in the Surtees et al. task spontaneously adopted the perspective of their 
partner even when the partner was not attending to a perspective-dependent feature of the 
numeral on the screen is inconsistent with the findings of Elekes et al. However, this difference 
may be due to the difference between the alternating turn-taking task design used in the former 
study, and the simultaneous task design used in the latter. It is possible that the turn-taking 
activity created the sense of a shared goal, when in fact there was none. 
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this set of findings is that Level-2 
perspective-taking can, at times, be fast and efficient, provided that subjects are provided with 
the right background knowledge and are sufficiently motivated. This contradicts the claim that 
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Level-2 perspective-taking is a slow and effortful process. In more ecologically valid tasks that 
use a live participant rather than an avatar, Level-2 perspective-taking turns out to be 
spontaneous (just like Level-1 perspective-taking).  
These findings create something of a puzzle for both the two-systems theorists and its critics, 
such as Carruthers: if Level-2 perspective-taking tasks place inherent demands on working 
memory (either because working memory is a constitutive part of explicit mindreading more 
generally, or because of the mental rotation confound), how come subjects were able to 
efficiently generate Level-2 perspective representations in these circumstances? The answer 
may be related to the fact that spontaneous perspective-taking only occurred when subjects 
possessed the appropriate prior knowledge (in addition to the right motivations). Once subjects 
learned that their partners’ perspective systematically differed from their own (e.g. “If I see 6, 
he sees 9”), they would have been able to store that knowledge as a mentalistic schema in long-
term memory, where it would have been available for rapid retrieval.10 Thus, even if subjects 
had to initially engage in effortful mental rotation to judge their partner’s perspective, they 
would subsequently be able to infer their perspective without any effortful spatial reasoning at 
all. By using memory-based strategies, subjects would have been able to circumvent the need 
for any effortful use of working memory.11  
It is worth noting that Apperly (2010) does discuss one possible way that explicit, demanding 
forms of mindreading could be rendered fast and efficient: downwards modularization. The basic 
idea behind downwards modularization is that expertise can render otherwise demanding tasks 
fast and efficient. For example, where an average chess player might discover a path to 
checkmate through slow, effortful reasoning, an expert player might, thanks to her extensive 
experience, arrive at a similar conclusion in a seemingly effortless manner. One way that this 
sort of efficiency-through-expertise can be achieved is when a body of knowledge – initially 
acquired through explicit, effortful processes – is used so often that it leads to the formulation 
of cognitive schemas. These schemas enable us to rapidly pair inputs to the appropriate 
																																								 																				
10 Christensen and Michael (2015) discuss the use of schemas in mindreading at length in their “cooperative multi-
systems architecture” proposal, which they offer as an alternative to the two-systems account. 
11	Interestingly, Michelon and Zacks discovered that subjects also tended to use memory-based strategies in a 
Level-1 perspective-taking task: instead of calculating the line-of-sight of an agent directly, participants simply 
memorized the set of objects that the agent could see, and this led to increased performance (Michelon and Zacks 
2006). The experimenters, who were interested in studying how line-of-sight is calculated, developed a method to 
control for this strategy. But it highlights the fact that memory-based perspective-taking strategies provide an 
ever-present, efficient alternative to the use of more spatial forms of reasoning, whether these involve line-of-sight 
calculation or mental rotation.	
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behavioral outputs without having to go through any effortful, explicit reasoning. But, 
according to proponents of downwards modularization, this efficiency is achieved at the cost of 
flexibility. Just like innate “original” modules, these acquired modules are ultimately 
encapsulated from goals and background knowledge. Apperly suggests that downwards 
modularization might often occur with our explicit mindreading abilities: an expert poker 
player may, for example, become so well-practiced that she is able to automatically detect a 
bluff without needing to engage in any explicit reasoning at all.12  
However, the effects on Level-2 perspective-taking described above are not plausibly the result 
of downward modularization. First, subjects never had the explicit goal of monitoring the other 
agent’s perspective at all; Level-2 perspective-taking was actually detrimental to their 
performance on the explicit task. Expertise, in this context, would consist in ignoring the 
partner, not representing the way she saw the number. Second, it is implausible that subjects 
came into the experiment with an acquired module for Level-2 perspective-taking. If this were 
the case, then altercentric interference should have been present across all the Joint conditions 
(or, in the case of the Surtees et al. findings, the conditions where partners were merely present, 
but not yet engaged in the number-verification task), not just the ones where subjects shared a 
similar goal. The fact that these altercentric interference effects were so context-sensitive 
suggests that the Level-2 perspective-taking abilities brought by subjects to the lab were 
flexible and goal-dependent, not stimulus-driven. Thus, the fast and efficient Level-2 
perspective-taking that we find in these studies seems to occur in spite of the fact that it is 
unencapsulated, which runs contrary to the downwards modularization proposal.  
6. Implications for the two-systems account 
The arguments of the last two sections create serious problems for the two-systems account of 
perspective-taking. Contrary to that framework, it appears as though both Level-1 and Level-2 
perspective-taking can be fast and efficient, but also sensitive to goals and background 
knowledge. Thus, both forms of perspective-taking appear to occupy the “spontaneous” middle 
ground between the fast-yet-inflexible and flexible-yet-slow information-processing profiles of 
the implicit and explicit mindreading systems. In both cases, this combination of flexibility and 
efficiency seems to be achieved through the interaction between executive systems, long-term 
																																								 																				
12	See Thompson (2014) for a detailed critique of this proposal. 
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memory, and motivational factors. This is not to say that the underlying processes in the two 
kinds of perspective-taking are really identical: both seem to make use of different cognitive 
strategies, and are suited to different types of problems. But neither are the two clearly 
dissociable, as the two-systems framework would suggest. 
One obvious conclusion to be drawn from this fact is that there need not be any trade-off 
between speed and representational flexibility when it comes to our perspective-taking abilities. 
On its own, this conclusion may not be fatal to the two-systems account: perhaps the 
distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking does not map onto the implicit and 
explicit mindreading systems after all, but this framework may still capture important 
distinctions when it comes to other forms of mental-state attribution. However, the case of 
perspective-taking should also lead us to view the basic idea of a flexibility-efficiency trade-off 
in the domain of mindreading with suspicion. Not only does this notion of a trade-off not apply 
in the case of perception – the domain it was originally intended to explain – but now it has 
also fallen short in explaining the cognitive underpinnings of one of our core mindreading 
abilities. Why expect that it should suddenly apply elsewhere? 
As a matter of fact, there is evidence that in addition to Level-1 perspective-taking, other forms 
of “implicit” mindreading also appear to be unencapsulated from background knowledge. For 
instance, the attribution of motor intentions13 through motor simulation or “mirror neurons” is 
often suggested to be automatic and encapsulated from background knowledge. Most 
commonly, this process is said to involve the automatic mapping of the visual kinematics of an 
observed action onto the motor system. Our motor system then simulates the performance of 
that same action, which permits an inference to a guiding motor intention (Rizzolatti and 
Craighero 2004) by using our motor planning system in reverse (Jeannerod et al. 1995). 
According to this view, the only inputs to the mirror neuron system are the low-level visual 
properties of actions.  
However, other research on the mirror neuron system is inconsistent with this picture. 
Monkeys’ mirror neurons do not activate for mimicked actions, as when they observe an 
experimenter pretending to grasp a non-existent object (Gallese and Goldman 1998); 
																																								 																				
13	Motor intentions are intentions to engage in a particular motor action, such as grasping or throwing. These are 
distinct from distal or future intentions (what I plan to do at some point in the future) and present intentions (what 
I plan to do now, framed at a level of abstraction that is independent of any particular motor plan) (Pacherie 2008; 
Spaulding 2015).	
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conversely, monkeys’ mirror neurons do activate when they witness an occluded grasping 
action that has no low-level visual properties – but only if they know in advance that there is 
food behind the occluder (Umiltà et al. 2001). In humans, it’s been found that background 
knowledge about whether or not an observed action is intentional, or whether it has been 
carried out by an intentional agent, affects the degree to which they are motor-primed to 
perform that same action (an effect of mirror neuron activity) (Liepelt and Brass 2010; Liepelt 
and Cramon 2008). In other words, the attribution of motor intentions, just like the attribution 
of Level-1 perspectives, does not seem to be fully automatic or informationally encapsulated. 
Rather, it is sensitive to background knowledge and abstract features of context. Several 
authors have taken these findings as evidence that the mirror neuron system actually reflects 
the effects of a top-down, information-rich form of action prediction, rather than a low-level 
mapping process (Gergely and Csibra 2008; Kilner and Frith 2007).  
Further problems for the two-systems account of mindreading arise from studies of “implicit” 
false-belief14 tracking (Schneider, Bayliss, et al. 2012). In these tasks, subjects in an eye-tracker 
passively observe videos of an agent hiding an object and then leaving a room. While the agent 
is absent, the location of the object is changed. When she returns, subjects look in anticipation 
towards the previous location of the hidden object (the one last seen by the agent), suggesting 
that they were tracking her false beliefs. When subjects were debriefed after the task, they 
showed no sign that they were consciously tracking the agent’s belief, suggesting that any 
belief-tracking that occurred was unconscious and implicit. However, when subjects in the same 
task are given even a light working-memory task, the implicit belief-tracking effect vanishes 
(Schneider, Lam, et al. 2012). One way of interpreting this finding is to conclude that implicit 
belief-tracking involves working memory; however, given that the contents of working 
memory are usually conscious, and subjects reported no conscious belief-tracking, this seems 
unlikely. What’s more plausible is that when subjects were engaged in the working memory 
task, they shifted too much attention away from the agent’s perspective for encoding of belief-
states to occur or be fixed in long-term memory. Thus, implicit belief-tracking does not seem to 
be genuinely automatic; rather, as Level-1 perspective-taking, it’s likely that we possess a 
																																								 																				
14 Proponents of the two-systems account would deny that these experiments provide evidence for “belief-
tracking,” since they hold that the implicit system does not represent “full-blown” propositional attitudes. Rather, 
they would describe these results as evidence of the tracking of “registrations,” a quasi-mentalistic, implicit 
analogue of beliefs represented by the implicit system (Butterfill and Apperly 2013). 
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standing disposition to represent the beliefs of others, but only when doing so is either 
cognitively efficient or somehow goal-relevant.  
These findings suggest that other forms of implicit mindreading may also be spontaneous and 
context-sensitive, rather than automatic and encapsulated. If so, then the entire two-systems 
framework may be in jeopardy. The principal theoretical motivation for the two-systems 
account was that fast, efficient, “implicit” processes are likely to be encapsulated, which in turn 
yields signature limits on their representational capabilities. Instead, we find that implicit 
mindreading processes are generally quite flexible, and well-integrated with long-term 
memory, executive systems, and goals. If this is right, then it’s not obvious whether there really 
are any grounds for holding the implicit mindreading system exists.  
If the implicit mindreading system is not present in adults, this also casts doubt on the 
developmental claims of the two-systems view. Part of the two-systems approach to 
development has been to propose that younger children’s early theory-of-mind abilities (e.g. 
Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) are products of the implicit mindreading system, and thus subject 
to “signature limits” on their representational abilities (Butterfill and Apperly 2013); in 
particular, children below the age of four should not be able to pass Level-2 perspective-taking 
tasks, since these require “full blown” propositional attitude attribution. Proponents of the two-
systems account tested this prediction in two separate studies, and obtained seemingly positive 
results: infants’ looking times did not reflect any Level-2 perspective-taking, and thus seemed 
subject to signature limits (Low and Watts 2013; Low et al. 2014). But as with other Level-2 
perspective-taking tasks, these paradigms involved mental rotation, and thus potentially 
confound Level-2 perspective-taking with effortful uses of working memory (Carruthers 
2015c).  
When this mental-rotation objection is supplemented by the revelation that the “signature 
limits” interpretation is based on an erroneous, encapsulated conception of the implicit 
mindreading system, it becomes all the more clear that these results provide no support for a 
two-systems account of infant theory-of-mind abilities. If infant mindreading abilities are really 
subject to any signature limits on their representational capabilities, it is unlikely that these are 
due to a distinct, encapsulated mindreading system that persists into adulthood. These 
limitations are more likely the product of immature executive resources, motivational factors, 
or a lack of relevant experience. Collectively, these factors may create a kind of ersatz 
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encapsulation early in development, but this would dissipate as children’s developing executive 
resources and increasing social experience provides them with a more flexible, integrated set of 
mindreading abilities.  
7. Conclusion: Efficient, context-sensitive mindreaders 
Beyond its implications for the two-systems account, this critique highlights some important 
features of our mature mindreading abilities. One is that several implicit forms of mindreading 
do not seem to be genuinely automatic; rather, we deploy these capacities selectively, in a 
context-sensitive, goal-dependent fashion (although we may also be generally motivated to 
engage in mentalizing when doing so is cognitively efficient). However, our context-sensitive, 
goal-dependent mindreading abilities can still be quite fast and efficient. This combination of 
speed and context-sensitivity seems to be due to the integration of domain-specific mindreading 
mechanisms with domain-general attentional processes and background knowledge. We also 
find that even complex, so-called “explicit” forms of mental-state attribution, such as Level-2 
perspective-taking, can also be both fast and efficient, provided that we possess the right 
background knowledge and that we are appropriately motivated.  
Another significant conclusion to draw from this discussion is that whether we spontaneously 
engage in very simple forms of mindreading, or very complex forms of mindreading, or no 
mindreading at all, seems to be a function of our motivations. Along with our background 
knowledge, our social attitudes seem to determine the amount of processing resources that go 
into representing the minds of others. Sometimes, we are highly motivated to represent the 
mental states of others accurately, and we make use of background knowledge in order to do so 
quickly and efficiently; at other times, we are less motivated, and as a result our mental state 
representations are much sparser, as we rely on general-purpose heuristics, such as computing 
line-of-sight. And, as we saw in many of the gaze-cueing studies, sometimes our background 
beliefs about the intentional status of an agent or its social group membership give us reason to 
ignore its perspective altogether. The depth of processing involved in a given mindreading task 
thus depends on our social goals.  
Moreover, as we saw in the discussion of Elekes et al. (2016) and Surtees et al. (2016), the 
availability of relevant background knowledge enables the mindreading system with a way to 
circumvent slower, more effortful forms of reasoning. Notably, in these studies, the relevant 
background knowledge was not antecedently available to the participants when they first 
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engaged in the task. But when subjects were sufficiently motivated to do so, they were able to 
generate situation-specific, mentalistic schemas that enabled them to rapidly update their 
representation of their partner’s mental states. In other words, one of the things that we seem 
to do during social interactions is create shortcuts that make the task of mindreading faster and 
more efficient – provided, that is, that we are motivated to do so.  
Now, contrast this picture of mindreading with the one put forward by mindreading skeptics 
and endorsed by two-systems theorists (Apperly 2011; Bermudez 2003; Zawidzki 2013). On 
their view, genuine mental-state attribution consists in a holistic, unbounded form reasoning 
that parallels the structure of first-person decision-making. According to this picture, 
mindreaders must, when inferring the mental cause of an action, consider an indefinite range of 
potential belief-desire combinations. The computational demands of this kind of mental-state 
inference are surely immense. Clearly, as a theory of how we are able to seamlessly engage in 
complex forms of coordination or quickly infer intended speaker meanings, this model of 
mindreading is inadequate; rather, it seems to represent the mental-state attribution strategy of 
an ideal thinker, unhindered by the demands of computational complexity. 
Not being ideal thinkers ourselves, we rarely – if ever – engage in this kind of mindreading. 
But, contrary to the mindreading skeptic, this does not mean that we rarely engage in 
mindreading at all. Nor does it mean that we rely on a module for quasi-mentalistic 
mindreading, as the two-systems theorists have proposed. Rather, we deploy a range of flexible 
mentalizing strategies to navigate the social environment, which we tailor to match our 
situational needs. Some of these strategies may indeed involve effortful, working-memory based 
forms of cognition. But we do not engage in these effortful reasoning strategies any more than 
is necessary. Instead, we supplement this kind of reasoning with a number of more efficient 
strategies. Sometimes, these involve simple, spatial heuristics, as with Level-1 perspective-
taking. But we also use more effortful forms of reasoning to create mindreading shortcuts, in 
the form of mentalistic schemas that may be rapidly retrieved from memory in order to 
maintain up-to-date models of other people’s mental states. And even these more efficient forms 
of mindreading are deployed in a selective, context-sensitive manner. In short, we economize 
our mindreading strategies so that they may best fit our needs. We only ever mindread as much 
as we have to.  
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Thus, skeptical doubts about the mindreading paradigm can be assuaged once we appreciate the 
context-sensitive, goal-dependent nature of mental-state attribution. It is a mistake to believe 
that everyday mindreading consists in a holistic, unbounded form of “central” reasoning. It is 
also a mistake to argue that if we rarely engage in this idealized form of mindreading, then we 
must not mindread very much at all. The two-systems view attempted to carve out a middle 
ground between these two extremes, but it erred in its concession to the skeptic that “full-
blown” mindreading must cognitively effortful. With the case of spontaneous perspective-
taking, I’ve shown that our mindreading abilities are much more flexible, efficient and context-
sensitive than either the two-systems theorists and the skeptics had thought possible.  
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